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WAR

**A MILITARY AND
POLITICAL HISTORY,
1861-1865**

*Indiana
University
Press*

BLOOMINGTON AND INDIANAPOLIS



A GREAT CIVIL

yet higher degree of perfection by the still greater disparity in numbers. No military commander since Napoleon himself had surpassed or ever would surpass Lee's exercises in Napoleonic battlefield tactics at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville. No wonder that Confederate leaders and citizens together could take heart that whatever the internal troubles of the Confederacy, their army and especially its greatest chieftain could save them from all military dangers. The Army of Northern Virginia under R. E. Lee was hardly a mirror of Confederate society. Its strengths far transcended those of the beleaguered society.

Nevertheless, Chancellorsville should not have been so heartening as most Confederates appear to have found it. Lee had defeated not so much the Army of the Potomac as Joseph Hooker, who in fact had gone a long way toward defeating himself, albeit because of Lee's psychological ascendancy over him. Whenever the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac were given a fair chance to fight, they did so with tenacity and ferocity, and with their army's customary tactical skill at every level save that of the highest headquarters. Union casualties were some 1,575 killed, 9,594 wounded, and 5,676 missing for a total of 16,845. Confederate casualties are estimated at 1,665 killed, 9,081 wounded, and 2,018 missing, a total of 12,764. Thus all Lee's skills in generalship could not prevent his casualties from numbering about 22 percent of his army, with his total force estimated at 57,352; while the Union army lost only 16 percent of an aggregate present of 104,891, or 13 percent if Hooker is credited with his full 134,000.⁸³ Even in his greatest battle, Lee had imposed on the scarcest and most indispensable Confederate resource—the lives of Confederate soldiers—a cost that could foreshadow only a downward spiral of Southern military fortunes.

LEE TURNS NORTH

Nevertheless, the victory at Chancellorsville made it possible for Lee to return to the strategy that he believed could assure the ultimate triumph of Confederate arms in defiance of the weaknesses of Southern society, the strategy that could win the war: an offensive strategy of invasion of the North. Ever since his retreat from Sharpsburg, Lee had chafed to march northward across the Potomac again. Less than a week after his retreat into Virginia from Maryland in September of 1862 he had told President Davis that his best move would be to return to Hagerstown, but that his army required refitting. By the time he defeated Burnside at Fredericksburg in December, he had rebuilt the Army of Northern Virginia to a new crest of self-

confidence and to its highest numerical strength, 75,513 soldiers, since the Seven Days.⁸⁴ He would have turned his troops northward with the first warmth of spring in 1863 had not a Federal threat to the Virginia and North Carolina coast compelled Longstreet's detachment to Suffolk. This diversion at least allowed the detached formations to renourish themselves and their horses in a region not yet exhausted by war. But the diversion also obliged Lee to parry Hooker's offensive at Chancellorsville, and Lee did not believe that such defensive victories as Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville could win the war.

As early as February, Lee had directed Jackson's talented mapmaker Captain Jedediah Hotchkiss, Topographical Engineers, to prepare a map of the routes from the Valley of Virginia to the Pennsylvania capital at Harrisburg and on to Philadelphia.⁸⁵ With the moral ascendancy of his own Army of Northern Virginia over the rival Army of the Potomac seemingly redoubled by the triumph over odds at Chancellorsville, Lee summoned Longstreet back to him, cajoled Davis for other reinforcements from scattered garrison troops, and on June 3 took the road to Pennsylvania.

Stonewall Jackson would not march with him. After a seemingly successful operation to amputate Jackson's left arm, pneumonia set in, and Stonewall died on May 10. Richmond's largest wartime crowds watched the body being borne through the streets and passed in mourning before it as it lay in state in the Capitol Rotunda. On May 15 Jackson was buried, as he had asked, back home in the Valley, "at Lexington, and in my own plot."⁸⁶ The Confederacy's most popular and most beloved military hero was gone — the Presbyterian warrior so grim and stern in his service to his Cromwellian God of war, yet also a modest backwoods western Virginian more human and comprehensible than the aristocratic demigod Lee.

Stonewall Jackson was gone; but the superb infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia still marched, and solid "Old Pete" Longstreet, and impetuous Powell Hill, and gallant Jeb Stuart, and Dick Ewell returned from his wound. All prepared to join Lee on the roads to Pennsylvania. Why should they not repeat Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville on Northern soil? And if they did, what would the sorrows, the discords, and the privation within the Confederacy count for, after all, in the outcome of the war?

governmental leaders who thought conscription had become essential. Volunteering still seemed the American way to raise an army, conscription undemocratic. Neither Congress nor the executive was yet willing to face up to a thoroughgoing Federal control over the nation's manpower. With such attitudes, the draft functioned less as a direct source of soldiers than as a stimulus to volunteering. Communities could avoid the imposition of the draft within their boundaries by meeting their quotas with volunteers, and political and business leaders staged new recruiting drives to find the requisite volunteers. Enrollment under the draft act began on May 25, 1863. The first drafting took place from the beginning of July into August. This effort provoked the famous July 13–15 draft riots in New York City and similar disturbances elsewhere, and yet the conscription machinery was so inefficient and the intentions of the Enrollment Act so diluted that the effort netted only 35,883 men — albeit along with \$15,686,400 in commutation fees.¹⁷

To the end of the war, only 6 percent of the 2,666,999 men who served in the Union Army were directly conscripted. Commutation fees were paid by 86,724 men, 116,188 substitutes served, and only 46,347 men were directly obliged to enter the ranks.¹⁸

THE MARCH TO GETTYSBURG

Even this limping draft came too late to assist the Union in the crisis created by Lee's offensive strategy in the late spring and early summer of 1863. As nearly one-fifth of the Army of the Potomac folded its tents and drifted away because of expired enlistments, no replacements were available. The new campaign would reach its climax with that army and Lee's reorganized and reinforced Army of Northern Virginia more nearly equal in numbers than in any other major contest of the war, some 75,000 Confederates against 88,289 Federals.¹⁹

On the Confederate side, President Davis spent a worrisome May as the campaign for Vicksburg took more and more ominous shape, while Lee simultaneously urged him that the only solution to the Confederacy's military problems was to invade the Northeast. Davis and James A. Seddon, Secretary of War since the previous November 21,²⁰ believed that their best move might be to draw reinforcements from Lee's successful army to rescue Vicksburg. The President and Lee debated the strategic issues by correspondence and in two visits by Lee to Richmond.

As Lee saw matters, no feasible reinforcement could any longer assure the relief of Vicksburg; diminishing the Army of Northern Virginia was likely

only to endanger Richmond as well. If the Army of Northern Virginia took the offensive, however, any Federal plans for a summer offensive in the East would be disrupted; this achievement could be expected at the very least. The Army of the Potomac occupied too strong a position on the north bank of the Rappahannock to be attacked there with advantage, but if it could be drawn away, more favorable ground for an attack might well be found. An advance by the Army of Northern Virginia into Maryland and Pennsylvania would relieve Virginia of the burden of armies through the summer and permit Virginia farmers to harvest their crops, while the army replenished its commissary stores from the rich fields and herds beyond the Potomac River.

Victory after victory won in Virginia had not sufficed to win the war for the Confederacy; but victory over the Army of the Potomac on northern soil might well turn the Northern political balance in favor of the Peace Democrats, enough to force the Lincoln administration into a negotiated settlement. A decisive victory in battle on Northern soil might even strike a hard enough moral as well as physical blow to achieve at last the long-sought object that had been eluding Lee since his first pursuit of it in the Seven Days, the destruction of the enemy army. "So, if General Lee remained inactive," Major Charles Marshall of his staff summed up, "both Vicksburg and Richmond would be imperilled, whereas if he were successful north of the Potomac, both would be saved."²¹

Davis acquiesced and took the risk of reinforcing Lee with troops from the Atlantic coast. On June 3 the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia broke its camps around Fredericksburg. Stonewall Jackson's Corps was now commanded by Jackson's old coadjutor of the Valley Campaign, Richard Stoddert Ewell, promoted to lieutenant-general May 23 as was appropriate to his assuming corps command.²²

On June 9 a hard-fought cavalry battle at Brandy Station near Culpeper — sabres flashing in mounted charge and countercharge in the old style — failed to unveil the nature of Confederate movements and intentions to the Union horsemen who crossed that day to the south shore of the Rappahannock.²³ The Army of the Potomac still focused much of its attention on the Confederate camps remaining around Fredericksburg, aware that some kind of movement was going on to the westward, but unsure where Lee's center of gravity lay, and fearful of committing itself in a probing attack against Fredericksburg lest Lee then descend from the west upon its line of communications.

"I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river," Lincoln warned Hooker when he considered a large-scale Rappahannock crossing, "like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs, front and

rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other.”²⁴ But with the Federals’ caution, on the evening of June 13 Ewell’s Corps appeared among the hills overlooking Winchester far away in the Shenandoah Valley, and Longstreet’s Corps was on the march following Ewell. The Army of the Potomac was still opposite Fredericksburg, watching Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill’s new Confederate Third Corps (created May 30, with Hill commanding since June 1; he ranked as lieutenant-general from May 23).²⁵

During the next two days Ewell seized Winchester and battered its fleeing garrison. On June 14 the Army of the Potomac at last began marching northward toward Centreville, to pursue a Confederate vanguard that began crossing the Potomac near Williamsport, Maryland the next day. Lee then called on Hill’s Corps to hasten to rejoin the rest of the army.

On June 12 Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania had issued a proclamation confirming the rumors that his state was in danger of invasion and calling on the citizens to rally to the defense of their homes and firesides by enlisting in an emergency force of home guards.²⁶ Much that occurred in Pennsylvania and the North during the next few days might have gratified Lee’s hopes that the Northern will was fragile enough for his invasion to break it and win the war. When Lee threatened Pennsylvania and the North in the Antietam campaign the year before, the patriotic zeal of the first period of the war was not yet dead, McClellan still embodied that first flush of enthusiasm in the popular ardor he aroused as commander of the Army of the Potomac, the Emancipation Proclamation had not yet embittered a significant segment of Northern sentiment against the Lincoln administration, and appeals for home guards had readily produced a rush of enlistments. Now calls for emergency troops fell flat; only a trickle of men enlisted in Pennsylvania or elsewhere.

The raising of home guards was complicated, moreover, by an effort on Stanton’s part to escape dependence on the states and their militias by creating a Federal emergency force under Federal command and committed to serve whenever the North might be threatened for the duration of the war. Northern men who might have signed on for the immediate emergency did not want to risk being called to active duty repeatedly. At Governor Curtin’s pleading, Stanton reduced his goal to enlistment for a maximum of six months, and President Lincoln called for 100,000 six-month volunteers on June 15, with Pennsylvania’s quota set at 50,000. But this call still asked for too much.²⁷ Not until June 26, when Curtin called for 60,000 men for a maximum of ninety days and for state rather than Federal service, with a promise of discharge as soon as the emergency ended,²⁸ were the terms of enlistment in the home guard liberal enough to bring forward significant

numbers of Pennsylvania emergency volunteers. Within three weeks some 24,000 joined up.²⁹ The response in neighboring states was similar, although New York distinguished itself as the only state to have an organized militia force ready at hand; over 10,050 militiamen from New York City and Brooklyn reached Harrisburg by June 25.³⁰

At the time of Curtin's June 26 call, Ewell's Corps was in Pennsylvania and about to march in two main columns from Chambersburg to Carlisle and York, A. P. Hill's Corps had reached Chambersburg, and Longstreet's First Corps was a day's march behind Hill. Although home-guard enlistments were about to pick up, Pennsylvania still exhibited a remarkable apathy as the invaders regrouped inside its boundaries. The Confederates thought many of the Pennsylvania German farmers they encountered had decided "a plague on both your houses," and sometimes Confederate troops seem to have been more generously offered cold water, coffee, and other refreshments than the Union soldiers who began to reach Pennsylvania — partly out of fear, to be sure. Philadelphia in particular presented a contrast to its aroused response to the Antietam campaign the year before. George W. Fahnestock, a businessman of the city, reported a strange indifference:

The archives and records of the State are loaded in cars, and now upon the sidings in West Philadelphia, dangerously near to large quantities of barrels of petroleum. Bailey & Co. sent me a circular yesterday, notifying their friends that all silverware and valuables deposited with them for safe keeping, will be at the owners risk. And yet the people are as quiet and apathetic as if it was all a false report. Thousands of able bodied young fellows are ever parading the streets, but no enlistments go with spirit. These chaps can lounge and dress, swinging canes, or twirling moustaches, but they have no patriotism in their souls.³¹

The apathy prevailed, Fahnestock found, even though, as early as June 25,

[r]eports of the most exaggerated character flew from mouth to mouth, and it grew so improbable towards evening, that I was obliged to resort to argument and convince the children that the rebels were not astride of the telegraph wires. One came in with the report that Harrisburg had been surrounded, another that martial law had been proclaimed here. As I walked through Chestnut St, on my way home, and saw the moving crowds of able bodied young men lounging around, I wished that some compulsory way could be used to arouse their patriotism. The rebels have undisputed possession of the Cumberland Valley almost to the town of Carlisle. They have ravaged the crops, and stolen all the horses and cattle.³²

The last statement was scarcely an exaggeration. Ewell and Lee had issued orders that goods needed by the Confederacy were to be requisitioned by properly appointed officers and paid for at current market prices, and that when Northern citizens refused to sell on those terms, the goods were to be seized but their owners were to be given specific receipts for later redemption. It was the Confederates, however, who determined the current market prices, and they paid in Confederate currency that was badly depreciated in the South and almost worthless in the North. In south-central Pennsylvania the Confederates arrived when the wheat was ripe for the harvest, and they stripped the region of newly harvested and stored foodstuffs. Many Pennsylvanians fled from the invasion path with their horses and cattle as well as their movable goods, jamming the bridges across the Susquehanna at Harrisburg and Wrightsville. Nevertheless, one reasonably reliable Confederate estimate had it that Lee's army drove 26,000 cattle and 22,000 sheep from Pennsylvania and Maryland into Virginia. Black people had special reason to flee, for having been born and lived free in Pennsylvania was no protection against the Confederates' practice of sending south into slavery every African American who fell into their hands. By the hundreds African Americans also crossed to the east shore of the Susquehanna.

On June 28, having destroyed Thaddeus Stevens's Caledonia Furnace — along with saw mill, forges, and rolling mill in addition to the iron furnace — along the way from Chambersburg in retribution for Stevens's "most vindictive spirit toward the people of the South,"³³ Major-General Jubal A. Early imposed a ransom of \$100,000 on the city of York, threatening to sack the place if his demands were not met. (The citizens could raise only \$28,000, but Early did not fulfill his threat.) The vanguard of Early's Division of Ewell's Corps reached the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, though the Pennsylvania home guard burned the bridge there before the Confederates could cross the river. (Confederate soldiers of Brigadier-General John B. Gordon's Brigade of Early's Division labored valiantly and with success to prevent the spread of the fire into the town of Wrightsville.) On the same day, Brigadier-General Albert G. Jenkins's Brigade of cavalry in advance of the other prong of Ewell's Corps skirmished with some home-guard outposts outside Harrisburg and viewed Pennsylvania's capital from the west shore of the Susquehanna, a few miles away.

That same Sunday, however, Lee learned from a spy hired by Secretary of War Seddon, Henry Thomas Harrison, that the Army of the Potomac was in Maryland and closing in on him. He heard the news from a spy because Jeb Stuart, having become infatuated with the romantic risks and consequent popular applause associated with riding around the rear of the enemy

army after his previous experiences in doing so, was performing that trick again and had ridden out of touch with army headquarters. Nevertheless, Lee would now have to halt his farflung activities in gathering supplies and sowing Northern demoralization, to concentrate to meet the Army of the Potomac.³⁴

General Hooker's response to Lee's march northward had been no better than barely adequate. As Hooker's troops began to close in on the Confederates north of the Potomac, his dispatches to Washington soon betrayed the same symptoms of loss of nerve that had overcome him when he was in proximity to Lee at Chancellorsville. He had long been conducting a quarrel via telegraph with General-in-Chief Halleck over sundry grievances real and imagined, and he now involved himself in a debate with Halleck over his freedom to control the garrison at Harpers Ferry. On June 27, Hooker used this dispute as a reason to resign. Perhaps he fancied that he was merely blackmailing the War Department to give him control of the garrison, but his insecurity could have impelled him toward an escape from his responsibilities. Be that as it may, on the eventful Sunday of June 28, Hooker learned that Lincoln had accepted his resignation and put Major-General George G. Meade, U.S.V., in his place.

Meade, a sobersided, scholarly engineer officer who was appropriately enough a Philadelphian, displayed in his first days of army command an understandable uncertainty and even hesitancy about when and where he wanted to challenge Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia to battle. Nevertheless he kept pressing his formations northward into Pennsylvania and reaching out with his cavalry to feel where Lee's columns were located. On July 1 the First and Second Brigades of the First Division of his Cavalry Corps clashed with infantry of Major-General Henry Heth's Division of A. P. Hill's Corps along the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike just northwest of the borough of Gettysburg, seat of Pennsylvania College, a Lutheran Theological Seminary, and the County of Adams. Hill's and Ewell's Corps were converging toward Gettysburg because it was a road junction and a suitable place for Lee to effect his concentration now that he knew the enemy army was nearby. The Federal First Corps infantry was close behind the First Cavalry Division and promptly joined in its fight against Heth's Division, and before July 1 was over a major battle had flared up around Gettysburg between Hill and Ewell on the Confederate side and the First and Eleventh Corps of the Army of the Potomac for the Union.

GETTYSBURG: THE BATTLE



The great battle of Gettysburg: General Reynolds of the Union First Corps arrived to find Brigadier-General, U.S.V., John Buford's First Cavalry Division deployed west of the town astride the Chambersburg Pike on a low height called McPherson's Ridge. Buford was beginning a holding action to prevent the Confederates from seizing what he and then Reynolds quickly recognized as a ridge line superb for defense on the opposite side of the town, south and east of it. Here, the two Federal leaders thought, and Reynolds so informed Meade, an anvil might be formed on which to break the hammer of Lee's army. Buford had compelled Heth's Division to take the time to deploy from column of march into line of battle as it approached along the Chambersburg Pike, and the cavalry stand gave Reynolds the opportunity to hasten the van of his infantry into line on McPherson's Ridge. The Iron Brigade of Midwestern troops, the old Black Hat Brigade renamed for its stout fighting qualities particularly as displayed at South Mountain in the Antietam campaign, and formally the First Brigade, First Division, First Army Corps, appropriately was the first Federal infantry unit into line.³⁵

Reynolds was killed as he led the brigade's deployment in McPherson's Woods. Succeeding him as temporary corps commander was the leader of his Third Division, Abner Doubleday of Fort Sumter, a veteran of the Eastern battles since Second Bull Run, and since November 29, 1862 major-general, U.S.V. As hazy morning gave way to a bright, hot summer's afternoon, the magnetic pull of Gettysburg as a road junction, along with the accumulating perception on both sides of the possible tactical value of the adjacent hills, drew more and more troops into the fight.

Rodes's Division of Ewell's Corps approached from the north, whence it had been called from the foray to Carlisle and the west shore opposite Harrisburg. Its advance threatened the right flank of the Federal First Corps, anchored on an eminence called Oak Hill where McPherson's Ridge converged with another north-south rise of ground to the east of it, Seminary Ridge. Rodes's approach was imperfectly countered by the arrival of Howard's Eleventh Corps, which came too late to tie its left flank into the First Corps right, leaving a gap between the two Union corps for Confederate exploitation. Moreover, Early's Division of Ewell's Corps quickly followed Rodes's from the north, extending the latter's line eastward across the Harrisburg Pike. Early overlapped the Eleventh Corps right flank while Howard's left was also threatened. A question mark shadowed the reputation of the Eleventh Corps not only because of its rout at Chancellorsville, but also because its men were largely German-Americans, and in the mid-nineteenth

GETTYSBURG
THE FIRST DAY JULY 1, 1863
2:30 P.M.

Confederate positions
 Union positions



century everybody knew that Germans have a talent for music and poetry but not for war. The corps was also unlucky; today it fought stubbornly but crumbled under superior numbers and the turning of both its flanks. Its retreat southward through the streets of Gettysburg exposed the rear of the First Corps at a time when Doubleday's troops were already having to give ground before the superior numbers represented by Major-General William Dorsey Pender's Division added to Heth's Division as A. P. Hill's Corps renewed its pressure from the west. The Federal First Corps had to join in the retreat through Gettysburg.

The nucleus of the potential defensive line beyond the town was Cemetery Hill, just south of the grid of streets. Here retreating Federal troops were met and rallied by Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock, U.S.V., whom Meade had dispatched northward ahead of his command, the Second Corps, to try to assure retention of the ridge line whose value Reynolds had urged upon Meade by messenger just before he died. On Cemetery Hill General Howard also rallied the troops. There was a brief contretemps because Hancock claimed Meade's authority to take charge but Howard was senior in rank. Fortunately for their cause, the two Union generals agreed to cooperate, and they quickly made Cemetery Hill a stronghold, building upon the hitherto uncommitted Second Division of Howard's corps. Hancock also sent the Iron Brigade to hold the west slope of Culp's Hill, which rises just to the east and south of Cemetery Hill.

Cemetery Hill promptly became the focus of what has been one of the war's most vexed tactical controversies, as well as of the Union defense. General Lee, arriving on the battlefield in late afternoon, could not fail to observe the importance of the hill but gave General Ewell only discretionary orders to capture it. Lee preferred to deal with his principal subordinates using that kind of light touch of command; he regarded them as fellow gentlemen to whom peremptory orders would have been demeaning. This approach had usually worked well enough with Stonewall Jackson—although as the Seven Days showed, not always even with him. Now Lee had to lead subordinates of lesser capacity, and his kid-glove approach would often create trouble. Similar discretionary and indeed ambiguously phrased instructions to Jeb Stuart had contributed to Stuart's believing he had Lee's permission to ride off the chessboard earlier in the campaign, and Stuart's absence still plagued the Confederates on July 1 with ignorance of the whereabouts of much of the enemy army.

With Ewell, however, Lee's method of command on this occasion probably had little effect on the outcome of the battle. Admirers of Jackson have always preferred to think that Stonewall unlike Ewell would have swept the

bluecoats off Cemetery Hill and made their subsequent defense of the Gettysburg high ground impossible. This notion became a major part of the dogma of the postwar religion of the Lost Cause: if Jackson had lived, the Confederacy would have won the war. In fact, Cemetery Hill was naturally so strong a position, Hancock and Howard had so promptly prepared its defenses, Confederate redeployment of units disrupted by the street pattern of the town would have had to require so much time on a day already far gone, and anyway Ewell's troops were sufficiently frayed by an afternoon's hard fighting under the July sun as well as by the rush of pursuit, that by the time the Confederates could have mounted a serious assault on Cemetery Hill the Federals could almost certainly have defied their tired efforts to take it.³⁶

Meade reached Cemetery Hill about midnight. His troops were already extending the Cemetery Hill position into the famous fishhook line of Gettysburg. The point of the hook formed on Culp's Hill, where Union troops mainly of Slocum's Twelfth Corps joined the Iron Brigade during the night and the morning hours of July 2. The shank of the fishhook extended almost directly south from Cemetery Hill along Cemetery Ridge, where Hancock's Second Corps stacked arms as its men arrived. Cemetery Ridge almost fades away into a marshy lowland just before the ground rises up again about a mile and a half south of Cemetery Hill in two elevations, Little Round Top and immediately south of it Round Top. During the night of July 1–2 there were not yet enough Federals available to occupy the Round Tops in any strength. Initially the Second Division, Twelfth Corps was on Little Round Top, then as morning came Sickles's Third Corps extended the Second Corps line southward toward the Round Tops as it reached the field.

None of these hills or ridges is particularly lofty. Round Top rises about 350 feet above the surrounding countryside, and the other hills are all at least 100 feet lower. Nevertheless, the hills are steep enough, and they dominate the surrounding fields enough, that they provided a major advantage for their defenders, as all the principal leaders on both sides had recognized from Buford and Reynolds onward. Even gentle Cemetery Ridge could afford concealment and a degree of shelter to troops on its reverse slope.


As the Army of Northern Virginia came up, it formed a line a mile or so away from the Union positions, along Seminary Ridge and other ridges, continuing it south of the town, through Gettysburg from west to east, and bending southward to Benner's Hill opposite Culp's Hill. The Confederate line was concave and about four miles in length; the Union line was convex and about and about three miles long. The Federals thus enjoyed the military advantage of the interior lines. They could shift troops from point to point over much shorter distances than the Confederates.

The strength of the Union position notwithstanding, Lee resolved to attack it. To attack on this battlefield was the logical extension of the offensive strategy that had brought Lee to Gettysburg. Moreover, circumstances gave Lee little choice in the matter. He could not stand in position for any appreciable length of time waiting for the enemy to attack, because his army was subsisting off the country and had to continue to move to continue feeding its men and horses. When he conferred with Longstreet, his senior corps commander proposed an effort to slip around the left flank of Meade's army, get astride Meade's communications with Washington, and oblige Meade to do the attacking. This idea reflected Longstreet's preference for the defense over the attack, about which he was probably more clear-eyed than Lee; but the particular suggestion was less realistic. Lee felt reluctant to accept it because he did not know the roads and the countryside as he did in much of Virginia, and Jed Hotchkiss notwithstanding, he was not sure his maps of Pennsylvania and Maryland were reliable enough. Moreover, if he succeeded in turning Meade's army, he would at the same time leave Meade astride the Confederate line of communications. The Army of Northern Virginia fed itself by foraging, but should it need resupply of ammunition, it depended on the long wagon journey from the Virginia Central Railroad at Staunton in the Shenandoah Valley.

Furthermore, Meade could supply his army from other bases in addition to Washington and would not necessarily attack even if Lee took up a new position southeast of Gettysburg. Thereupon Lee would again confront his own need either to fight or to move. The strong defenses of Washington precluded a quick descent on the Federal capital with the Army of the Potomac immediately in his rear. The only practical alternative to fighting at Gettysburg, as Lee saw it, was to retreat, which meant abandoning the purposes for which he had marched north, except for the secondary one of gathering in the produce of Pennsylvania and Maryland while sparing Virginia. He could not bring himself thus to throw away his central strategy for winning the war. He must at least test that strategy in battle. He must fight at Gettysburg.

Therefore he planned for July 2 a two-pronged effort against the Union flanks. He persuaded a reluctant Longstreet to attempt to roll up the Union's Cemetery Ridge line south to north from its left. When Longstreet's First Corps commenced this main attack, Ewell's Second Corps would mount a secondary strike against the Federal right on Culp's and Cemetery Hills. A. P. Hill's Third Corps in the Confederate center, much of it badly battered the day before, would assist as opportunity offered.³⁷

Partly because Lee consumed much of the morning of July 2 in deciding upon this plan, partly because Longstreet dragged his feet to resist



street's March forming to 4 P.M. July 2

Longstreet's probable route


Alexander's probable route

Union signal men followed the route of Hood's artillery by dispersing his units until they were of

Pickett's Charge Afternoon July 3, 1863

ETTY'SBURG
 MONDAY JULY 2, 1863
 4:00 P.M.

- Confederate positions
- Union positions



initiating attacks that he regarded as a foredoomed Fredericksburg in reverse, partly because of problems of terrain encountered when the First Corps marched toward its launching position — Longstreet conducted a time-consuming countermarch when part of his original route proved to be visible from a Union Signal Corps station observed to be on Little Round Top, and at that did so not by simply turning around and letting his rear become his front but by ordering a laborious U-turn — for these reasons the main Confederate attack did not jump off until about four in the afternoon.

When James Longstreet at length committed himself to an attack, however, he dependably hit hard, and July 2 at Gettysburg presented no exception. He struck from south-southwest to north-northeast generally parallel to the Emmitsburg Road, which runs into Gettysburg from Emmitsburg, Maryland. Longstreet's right flank took up an alignment such that only a slight deviation from its natural line of advance — to say nothing of the evident attraction of high ground — would carry it up the slope of Little Round Top. Such an advance could compromise the strong position for the safety of which the Union had fought on the previous day. Round Top was too heavily wooded to be of much tactical utility, but the summit of Little Round Top was clear enough of trees to accommodate a battery or two of artillery, so that Confederate guns would be able to enfilade the Union left flank. As Longstreet's drive began, there were no Union troops on the Round Tops except for the signal station.

The Second Division, Twelfth Corps had occupied Little Round Top during the night, and Meade's instructions to Sickles called for his Third Corps to take up the same ground that division had held. Meade therefore believed well into July 2 that Federal troops occupied the hill anchoring his left. Sickles, however, was more concerned about the low-lying, wooded nature of the ground he was to hold just north of the Round Tops, if he extended the Cemetery Ridge line directly southward from the Second Corps. Just west of the low ground lay somewhat higher terrain, a V-shaped ridge extending from the rocky outcropping of the Devil's Den near the foot of Little Round Top west to its apex in John Sherfy's peach orchard, then sharply bending to the north along the line of the Emmitsburg Road. After Sickles during the morning failed to receive the permission he requested from Meade to move forward to the higher ground — Meade was not paying as much attention to his left as he should have — and after Sickles's reconnaissance efforts detected Confederate movement southward across his front, the impetuous politician-commander of the Third Corps ordered his corps into the Peach Orchard Salient. About 1 P.M., consequently, Sickles's corps not only left the Round Tops behind, but also took upon itself the

vulnerability to crossfire always inherent in a salient, while breaking any firm connection between itself and the rest of the Union line to its right.

Sickles had just arrived at Meade's headquarters behind the Second Corps near the Union center for a conference of corps commanders when firing broke out on his front. Meade called off the conference and immediately rode with Sickles toward the Peach Orchard. Sickles offered to withdraw from the salient, but Meade rightly told him it was too late. The army commander promptly returned to his command post to try to guard against the perils he had perceived in his belated tour of his left.

He ordered troops from the newly arriving Fifth Corps into the gap between the Third and Second Corps. He also ordered his chief engineer, Brigadier-General Gouverneur K. Warren, U.S.V., to Little Round Top to observe the whole scene of battle on the left and particularly to assure the safety of the hill. From the crest Warren saw rebels approaching, and after ordering the signalmen to make a show with their flags to suggest the heights were occupied, he hastened back down the slope to divert troops to the top. He met Colonel (83rd Pennsylvania) Strong Vincent's Third Brigade, First Division, Fifth Corps moving up to fulfill Meade's order to plug the gap vacated by the Third Corps, and by authority of the commanding general he ordered it to the summit.

As a result, Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain's 20th Maine deployed on the slope facing Round Top just in time to meet Colonel William C. Oates of the 15th Alabama leading his own regiment and most of the 47th Alabama, also of Brigadier-General Evander M. Law's Brigade, Major-General John Bell Hood's Division, as they crossed the saddle between the two Round Tops. Meanwhile Warren also grabbed Brigadier-General, U.S.V., Stephen H. Weed's Third Brigade, Second Division, Fifth Corps, from which Colonel Patrick O'Rorke led his 140th New York to be first to seize the crest. Vincent and Weed deployed their full brigades, with First Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett's Company D, 5th U.S. Artillery, accompanying Weed to the top. On the Confederate side, the Texas Brigade of Brigadier-General Jerome Bonaparte Robertson followed Law's Brigade into the fight for the hill. Weed, O'Rorke, and Hazlett all died in the struggle, and Vincent was mortally wounded, but Warren's swift action, brought about by Meade's quick dispatch of him to the scene, had saved a key to the Union line. The Federals held.

In the valley below, Longstreet's hard-driving attack by some 13,000 Confederates in the remainder of Hood's Division and in McLaws's Division gradually crushed the 10,000 or so troops of the smaller divisions of the Third Corps, Major-General, U.S.V., David B. Birney's First Division attempting

to hold from the Devil's Den to the Peach Orchard, Brigadier-General, U.S.V., Andrew A. Humphreys's Second struggling from the Peach Orchard northward. Meade busily pushed more and more reinforcements into the battle, most of Major-General, U.S.V., George Sykes's Fifth Corps and other troops drawn from all along the fishhook line. The Federals withdrew sullenly from the Peach Orchard salient and back toward the original Cemetery Ridge line. Sickles's left leg was shattered and would have to be amputated. Meade sent Hancock to take command of all the various troops fighting on the left. Toward dusk Sedgwick's Sixth Corps arrived, 15,000 men, the largest corps in the army, having marched through the night and the long hot day, thirty-five miles from Manchester, Maryland, "Uncle John" Sedgwick seeing to it that the bands played as much as the musicians' stamina would permit, to help keep up the cadence and to cheer the boys along.

When the first elements of Sedgwick's corps filed into position, the Union line was secure from Cemetery Ridge to the Round Tops. Afterward one of those nasty Civil War command controversies—akin to the one among the Confederates about the failure to capture Cemetery Hill on July 1—developed between Meade and Sickles and among their partisans, over Sickles's alleged folly as well as insubordination in moving his corps forward to the Peach Orchard. The affair was aggravated by the temperamental differences between the dour Philadelphia aristocrat who commanded the army and the rough Tammany Hall New Yorker who had led the Third Corps. At the distance of more than a century, even an admirer of Meade's overall conduct of the battle has to concede, however, that the elevation of the ground at the Peach Orchard went a long way toward compensating for the weaknesses of a salient, and more importantly, that Sickles's advance to the Emmitsburg Road provided the Federal army with a useful cushion of ground: Longstreet's Corps had to fight all evening with no more to show for it than driving the Federals back to the position from which they had started. If the contest had begun on the Cemetery Ridge line, the Union army would have had no acreage that it could safely yield. The name of Daniel Edgar Sickles may just possibly belong with those of Buford, Reynolds, Hancock, Warren, and the like among the saviors of the army at Gettysburg.

Meade had been able to pour reinforcements from his right as well as his center into the battle on his left because Ewell did not open his part of the Confederate attacks until twilight. He may well be more truly blameworthy on this account than for his controversial decision not to try for Cemetery Hill on the evening before. When Ewell did advance on July 2, Cemetery Hill proved too strong both by nature and in the resolution of its defenders—largely the Eleventh Corps Germans, along with fragments of the First

Corps, reinforced by Colonel (18th Ohio) Samuel S. Carroll's First Brigade, Third Division, Second Corps — to be taken. From Culp's Hill, Meade had withdrawn all of the Twelfth Corps except Brigadier-General, U.S.V., George Sears Greene's Third Brigade, Second Division. Greene had his men make as conspicuous nuisances of themselves as possible to suggest greater numbers, but the Confederates generally occupied the abandoned defenses. They might have achieved still more had it not been that, for reasons unknown, Culp's Hill was the only place at Gettysburg where the Federals had dug a strong system of earthworks. Anyway, it was too late at night for the Confederates to exploit their gains.

Meade conferred with his corps commanders, received agreement that the army should remain to fight a third day at Gettysburg, and predicted that Lee would attack his center, upon which he concentrated those parts of the Second Corps that had roamed elsewhere during July 2. Meade judged Lee's intentions correctly, because the Confederate commander was not yet ready to give up the climactic expression of his strategy, and having tested the Union flanks, he resolved to hit the center on July 3. Late on July 2, in A. P. Hill's only contribution to that day's battle, Anderson's Division had advanced eastward across the Emmitsburg Road on Longstreet's left, and the northernmost brigade of the division, Brigadier-General Ambrose R. Wright's, had moved a considerable distance up Cemetery Ridge not far south of a conspicuous copse of trees without meeting strong resistance. Wright's experience strengthened Lee's judgment that the Union center was the next appropriate target.

Major-General George E. Pickett's Division of Longstreet's Corps had just arrived from Chambersburg. Lee designated this fresh formation to be the core of the coming attack, joined by Heth's and two brigades of Pender's Divisions of Hill's Corps.³⁸ Longstreet would command the entire assault.

There was a contest on the Union right during the morning, when the Twelfth Corps returned to retake its old entrenchments. By about eleven A.M., General Slocum's men had succeeded in doing so.

The wandering General Stuart had reported to Lee on the night of July 2, and the commanding general had dispatched him with the three brigades that made up the heart of his division, that had just completed his ride around the Federals with him, and in which he felt the greatest confidence, to move around the army's right flank for an effort against Meade's line of communications to assist the projected infantry assault. Meade's rear was guarded against such a stroke by Brigadier-General David McM. Gregg, U.S.V., with the First and Third Brigades of his own Second Division, Cavalry Corps, plus the Second Brigade, Third Division under twenty-three-

year-old George Armstrong Custer, somewhat mysteriously jumped from first lieutenant, 5th U.S. Cavalry, to brigadier-general, U.S.V., on June 29. It was fitting that the flamboyant Custer should have made his debut as a ranking cavalry officer in one of the rare actions of the war that, like Brandy Station, featured an old-fashioned clash of mounted men.

About five miles east of Gettysburg, along and north of the Hanover Road, with some of the fighting on foot as well as on horseback, Gregg's troopers repeated another aspect of Brandy Station: they showed that Federal cavalry, so inferior to their Confederate rivals earlier in the war as to be regarded with contempt, could now meet mounted charge with mounted charge, saber stroke with saber stroke. With numbers slightly inferior to his adversary's, perhaps 3,000 engaged out of 5,000 against 5,000 of 6,000–7,000, Gregg repulsed Stuart to protect the Union rear.³⁹

On the main battlefield there was a lull from the close of the morning's Culp's Hill fighting through about the next two hours, while the Confederates completed the emplacing of some 160 guns for an artillery barrage to soften the way for the infantry attack, and the slightly fewer than 5,000 men of Pickett's Division and about 8,500 of Hill's Corps who were to make up the infantry assault formed up in sheltering woods on the reverse slope of Seminary Ridge. To the east, eighty guns took the available good positions in the shorter Union line to reply to the expected artillery and infantry attacks.

The Confederate artillery barrage began just after 1 P.M. and lasted almost two hours. Its thunder could be heard many miles away, perhaps even in Philadelphia, but it did relatively little harm to the Union's front-line defenders. The guns were firing high, and their shells generally exploded in the rear areas behind the crest of Cemetery Ridge, while the Union Second Corps infantry were behind low stone walls on the forward slope. Eventually Brigadier-General Henry J. Hunt, U.S.V., Meade's chief of artillery, ordered the Federal guns to cease firing, to conserve ammunition for repelling the infantry attack. General Hancock countermanded this order within his Second Corps, as was his prerogative, for the sake of the moral effect on his troops of the guns' firing. The cease-fire by many of the Federal cannon, however, persuaded Colonel Edward Porter Alexander, commanding the Artillery Reserve of Longstreet's Corps and in charge of the barrage, that if the infantry assault could succeed at any time, the time was now. He so informed Pickett. Asked by Pickett whether he should therefore charge, Longstreet gave a grudging nod of apparent assent.

The 13,500 Confederate attackers emerged from the woods where they had formed up, to be taken almost immediately under enemy artillery fire. The copse of trees near the Federal center had been the focus of Alexander's gunfire, and toward it Pickett's Division now marched, to do so executing a

left oblique while maintaining paradeground precision under cannon fire. Thus they closed up on the right of Brigadier-General James Johnston Pettigrew's temporary command, Heth's Division, which also came on steadily in spite of its heavy losses on the first day. On Pettigrew's left, however, the small Second Brigade of Colonel (40th Virginia) John M. Brockenbrough, commanded this day for reasons unknown by Colonel (47th Virginia) Robert M. Mayo, and to its right Brigadier-General Joseph R. Davis's Fourth Brigade, inexperienced except for the July 1 battle and severely mauled then, were without the support they were supposed to have from Pender's Division, now commanded by Major-General Isaac Ridgeway Trimble. Through an unexplained error, the two brigades of that formation had lined up not *en échelon* behind Pettigrew's left as Longstreet intended but behind Pettigrew's right. Raked by Federal shells, Mayo's and Davis's troops soon began to waver. Such Federal cannonading of both left and right caused the Confederates still more to bunch up toward the copse.

The Confederates climbed the fences bordering the Emmitsburg Road, and Union guns changed their ammunition from shell to case shot, antipersonnel charges that on bursting propelled a hail of deadly pellets into the rebel ranks. Union infantry added their musketry fire. The Confederates nevertheless paused to dress their lines on the east side of the Emmitsburg Road. Then they charged the last few hundred feet on the double. A compressed spearhead of Pickett's Division penetrated the Second Corps front into a westward-jutting angle of the protective stone walls just north of the clump of trees — henceforth the Bloody Angle. The 26th North Carolina of the First Brigade (Pettigrew's) of Heth's Division pushed somewhat farther eastward to reach the stone wall north of the Angle. So probably did others from Hill's Corps.

But Federal reinforcements also converged on the copse and the Angle, while to the north and the south Federal infantry emerged from the main line to assail the Confederate flanks. At most it was a few hundred Confederates who achieved the penetration of the Angle. Their tide receded from what the North soon came to call the High Water Mark of the Rebellion. The casualties of the charge numbered nearly two-thirds of the participants.

GETTYSBURG: THE ASSESSMENT

Overall, Confederate casualties in the three days' fighting amounted to 28,063: 3,903 killed, 18,735 wounded, 5,425 missing. With more than a third of his army *hors de combat*, Lee could not resume his attacks. As he had

done along the Antietam, he held his position long enough the next day to express his defiance, this time waiting until about 1 P.M. to begin his main withdrawal, although he had called Ewell back to Seminary Ridge and Longstreet away from the Devil's Den on the evening of July 3. For Meade to have attacked him, of course, would still have been for the Federals to risk Pickett's Charge in reverse. In a rainstorm, the Army of Northern Virginia began plodding toward the Potomac on the afternoon of the 4th of July, the downpour growing more torrential with the passing miles.

As usual, the victor's casualties were too high to permit the desired pursuit, although in President Lincoln's judgment Meade was to forfeit much of the luster he had won on the battlefield by failing to harass Lee to destruction. It was as unfair an assessment as Lincoln ever made. The Army of the Potomac lost 3,155 killed, 14,529 wounded, and 5,365 missing, a total of 23,049.⁴⁰ Moreover, its command structure was shattered; and because a pursuit is an offensive action and one likely to demand rapid and even intricate maneuver under adverse circumstances, it requires more from commanders even than a fighting retreat, one of the most difficult activities in war. Three of Meade's seven infantry corps were without the commanders who had begun the battle: the First, minus Reynolds; the Second, minus Hancock, because he went down badly wounded in the groin during Pickett's Charge; and the Third, without Sickles. Meade needed time to reorganize his army.

Meade's conduct of the pursuit not only detracted from his credit for the Gettysburg victory, especially with Lincoln, but also helped prevent him from rising to the highest circle among Civil War commanders in public esteem and historical stature afterward. That second circumstance is also unfair, because in the battle Meade had thoroughly outgeneraled Lee. Lee's failure to obtain the actions he expected of them from Stuart, Ewell, and Longstreet could serve as an object lesson in how not to command an army and how not to deal with subordinates. Meade in contrast put the right subordinate in the right place with the right understanding of his mission throughout the battle, with almost uncanny consistency.

The only exception was his handling of the unruly Sickles and his odd neglect of Sickles's sector, the left flank, through much of July 2. Otherwise the positive record includes Reynolds's presence when the battle began, to choose and defend the Gettysburg hills and ridges for the showdown with Lee, because Meade had chosen Reynolds to command the infantry reaching out closest to the Confederates as battle grew imminent (with Reynolds actually commanding the Left Wing of the army, including the Eleventh and Third Corps as well as his own First Corps). It includes Meade's dispatch of Hancock to hold the hills and ridges after Reynolds had reported on them but then died. It includes the dispatch of Warren to Little Round Top and

the availability of Sykes's Fifth Corps at the foot of the hill to provide Warren with the troops he needed to hold it. The record includes sending the dependable Hancock to restore order from the chaos on the left during Longstreet's assault of July 2. There is also good reason to assume that, foreseeing Lee's attack against the Federal center on the third day, Meade would have made other arrangements had not Hancock already commanded there. While thus deftly handling his subordinates, Meade also saw to the shifting of his troops from one threatened portion of the field to another with virtuoso timing.

George Gordon Meade was by no means the equal of Robert Edward Lee in overall capacity as a military commander. He was never to show a comprehensive grasp of strategy. While Lee himself displayed only occasional grasping of the operational art, Meade was never to do that much. In tactics, Meade never approached anything resembling the Napoleonic qualities of Lee at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville. At Gettysburg, nevertheless, Meade not only chose the right subordinates at the right times with nearly unerring consistency. He himself was the right general for the battle that Lee's strategy dictated must be if not the climactic battle of the entire war, then at least a principal competitor for that distinction.

For all that, Confederate defeat at Gettysburg was also the logical outcome of Lee's own generalship. Because Lee believed that the Confederacy must invoke the strategic offensive notwithstanding a defensive national policy, he led the Army of Northern Virginia into Pennsylvania under conditions such that it had no choice but to fight a battle there, and such that it was likely to lose the battle if the enemy produced reasonably competent generalship. On July 2 Lee had to attack — but to attack under the limiting conditions imposed by the geography of the field and the geography of the rival army's lines of communications was to court defeat.

Beyond the immediate fatal conditions of Lee's fighting at Gettysburg there lay the larger flaws in his strategic conceptions. A strategy that required Napoleonic victories on the battlefield was a most dubious strategy for the Confederacy, in spite of Lee's capacity to deliver sometimes tactical triumphs worthy of the great Emperor. Such a strategy was dubious because to win Austerlitz or Jena-Auerstädt triumphs that shattered enemy armies, even Napoleon had to pay the price of huge casualties in his own army to impose crippling losses upon the enemy. The Confederacy did not have Napoleon's reserves of manpower (and in the end, the toll of casualties he extracted from his own forces had ruined Napoleon himself). Lee had lost nearly one-fourth of his army in the Seven Days, 18,852 of 85,500; nearly 20 percent of his army at Second Manassas, 9,197 of 48,527; 13,724 of 51,844 at Antietam; 12,764 of 57,352 at Chancellorsville.⁴¹ And now at Gettysburg the toll was 28,000.

The Army of Northern Virginia could not bear this succession of costly battles. The Confederacy, already overmobilized at the beginning of 1863, lacked the manpower to fill its depleted ranks. By 1864, Lee was to discover that his army had lost the power to conduct effective offensive maneuver; but it was his own expensive mode of war that did most to bring it to that plight. The great Southern military historian Douglas Southall Freeman said of his study in command, *Lee's Lieutenants*: "The connecting thread of this book well might be that of the effort to create and to maintain competent senior officers."⁴² In the end, the Army of Northern Virginia was crippled because Lee could not obtain them; but the excessive battlefield attrition among his competent lieutenants was another product of Lee's own mode of war.

On the other hand, if not Lee's strategy, then what strategy could have won for the Confederacy? Criticism of Lee should not evade the painfulness of his and the Confederacy's strategic dilemma, that a defensive strategy was all too likely to multiply the advantages of the Union by allowing it to concentrate men and matériel at places of its choosing, and that consequently to stand on the defensive was even less promising than Lee's offensive strategy. The Confederacy lacked strategic options. Moreover, Lee was so deadly an opponent on the tactical level that he merits his place in the pantheon of great generals whatever his flaws.

When Lee retreated from Gettysburg to the Potomac, he did so with such tactical skill that he gave Meade no opening for any but a frontal assault upon him. Meade was a decidedly cautious commander, perhaps too cautious; perhaps Lee's army had suffered so badly that a reconnaissance in force against its defensive perimeter when it stood around Williamsport and Falling Waters on the Maryland shore of the Potomac on July 13 might have been developed into a successful attack. Yet the whole history of Civil War frontal attacks offers no good reason to think so. Cautious though he was, Meade nevertheless planned an attack for the following day, July 14 (and he had had nothing in particular to gain from one day's postponement). On the night of July 13–14, however, Lee retreated across the river, and the Gettysburg campaign ended.

VICKSBURG: PREPARATIONS

Lee gave the Confederacy in the Eastern theater of war a consistent strategy even if an expensive one. Lee had a design for winning the war that might have worked, if only he had triumphed at Gettysburg. In the West, the Confederacy suffered from a worse handicap than a possibly mistaken strategy.

of the attack, the attack itself, and its aftermath, supplementing Du Pont's own account in III, *The Repulse: 1863–1865*, 5–176. See also Rowena Reed, *Combined Operations in the Civil War* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1978), pp. 282–94. Du Pont was promoted rear-admiral July 30, 1862, to date from July 16; Hayes, ed., *Samuel Francis Du Pont*, I, cxv.

78. Hayes, ed., *Samuel Francis Du Pont*, I, lxxxvii–xc; Du Pont relinquished command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron to Rear-Admiral John A. Dahlgren on July 6, 1863; *ibid.*, xc.

79. "I Corps (Longstreet's)," Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, pp. 178–79, particularly 178; "II Corps (Jackson's, Ewell's, Early's)," *ibid.*, pp. 179–81, particularly 179; "Longstreet, James ('Pete')," *ibid.*, pp. 490–91, particularly 490; "Jackson, Thomas Jonathan ('Stonewall')," *ibid.*, pp. 432–33, particularly 432; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, II, 248n for the promotions, 269 for the corps organization; "North Carolina and Southern Virginia, Confederate Dept. of," Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, pp. 599–600, particularly 599. For Lee's strength, Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, p. 99, estimates the total engaged of the Confederates at the forthcoming battle of Chancellorsville as 57,352.

80. For the date of the assumption of command, "Hooker, Joseph," Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, pp. 409–10, particularly 409; for Lincoln's famous letter cautioning Hooker, A. Lincoln, Executive Mansion, Washington, January 26, 1863. To Major General Hooker, Autograph Letter Signed, owned by Alfred W. Stern, Chicago, Illinois, in Abraham Lincoln, *The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, Roy P. Basler, ed.; Marion Dolores Pratt and Lloyd A. Dunlop, assoc. eds. (9 vols. inc. index, The Abraham Lincoln Association, Springfield, Illinois; New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953; index, 1955), VI, 78–79, and O.R., XXV, pt. 2 (serial 40, 1882), 4; see also Williams, *Lincoln Finds a General*, II, Chapter XVII, "Joe Hooker Gets the Army and a Note," 547–70, especially 547–52. Edward J. Stackpole, *Chancellorsville: Lee's Greatest Battle* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1958), estimates Hooker's army at 134,668 effectives at the beginning of his campaign, p. 32.

81. "Stuart, James Ewell Brown ('Jeb')," Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, pp. 812–13 particularly 813. The present account of Chancellorsville is based on the most recent full-length studies, Ernest B. Furgurson, *Chancellorsville 1863: Soul of the Brave* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), and Stephen W. Sears, *Chancellorsville* (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996); also the classic John Bigelow, Jr., *The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A Strategic and Tactical Study* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1910); Freeman, *Lee*, II, 505–63; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, II, 524–635; III, *Gettysburg to Appomattox* (1944), 2–7; Williams, *Lincoln Finds a General*, II, 565–605.

82. There is a highly detailed account of the circumstances of Jackson's wounding in Charles Royster, *The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), pp. 209–21. See also James I. Robertson, Jr., *Stonewall Jackson: The Man, the Soldier, the Legend* (New York: Macmillan Publishing USA, Simon & Schuster Macmillan; London, Mexico City, New Delhi, Singapore, Sydney, Toronto: Prentice Hall International, 1997), pp. 727–36; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, II, 561–77. For the estimate of Early's strength, Furgurson, *Chancellorsville*, p. 115; for the estimates of Lee's and Jackson's strengths when Jackson undertook his flank march, *ibid.*, p. 142.

83. For the strength of Hooker's main force and that of Sedgwick, Furgurson, *Chancellorsville*, pp. 294, 142, respectively; for Stuart's force, "Chancellorsville Campaign," Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, pp. 136–40, particularly 138. For casualties and total strengths, Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, pp. 98 (Union), 99 (Confederate).

→84. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, p. 96, gives Confederate strength at Fredericksburg as 78,513 present for duty. His estimate of total Confederates engaged in the Seven Days is 98,481, p. 85; but he credits Lee with only 48,527 engaged at Second Manassas and Chantilly, and 51,844 at Sharpsburg, p. 92.

- 85. Edwin B. Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 8, citing Memorandum Book, Entry for Feb. 12, 1863, Jedediah Hotchkiss Papers, Library of Congress. On Hotchkiss, see William J. Miller, *Mapping for Stonewall: The Civil War Service of Jed Hotchkiss* (Washington, D.C.: Elliott & Clark Publishing, 1993).
- 86. Quotation from Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, II, 681, citing Mary Anna Morrison Jackson, *Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson* by His Widow, Mary Anna Jackson, with Introductions by John B. Gordon and Henry M. Fields, and Sketches by Fitzhugh Lee, S[amuel]. G. French and G. F. R. Henderson (Second Edition, Louisville, Ky.: The Prentice Press, Courier-Journal Job Printing Company, 1895), p. 456. For Jackson's last days, death, and burial, see Royster, *Destructive War*, pp. 193-99, 211-31, 229 for date of death, 198 for date of burial; Robertson, *Stonewall Jackson*, pp. 735-62, 750-53 for date of death, 760-61 for date of burial; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, II, 577-82, 667-89, 678-82 for date of death, 686 for date of burial.

8. THREE SEASONS OF BATTLE

1. By command of Major-General McClellan: L[orenzo]. Thomas, Adjutant-General, General Orders, No. 105. Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, December 3, 1861. The following orders have been received from the Secretary of War. . . . U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (four series, 70 vols. in 128, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series Three, I (serial 122, 1899), 722-23. On December 1, 1861, Cameron reported the total strength of the Army as 660,971; Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, War Department, December 1, 1861. To the President, *ibid.*, 698-708, figure from 699. Hereafter cited as O.R.; references are to Series One unless otherwise specified.

2. By order of the Secretary of War: L. Thomas, Adjutant-General. General Orders, No. 33. War Dept., Adjt. General's Office, Washington, April 3, 1862. [Paragraph] III, *ibid.*, Series Three, II (serial 123, 1899), 2-3; see also 3 for Stanton's original, handwritten, unsigned draft.

3. By order of the Secretary of War: L. Thomas, Adjutant-General, General Orders, No. 49. War Dept., Adjt. General's Office, Washington, May 1, 1862, *ibid.*, p. 28; and Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, War Department, Washington, D.C., May 1, 1862, To Major-General Halleck, Pittsburg Landing, *ibid.*, p. 29.

4. By order of the Secretary of War: L. Thomas, Adjutant-General, General Orders, No. 60. War Dept., Adjt. General's Office, Washington, June 6, 1862. [Paragraph] I, *ibid.*, p. 109.

5. Israel Washburn, Jr., Governor of Maine; N[athaniel]. S. Berry, Governor of New Hampshire; Frederick Holbrook, Governor of Vermont; Wm. A. Buckingham, Governor of Connecticut; E[dwin]. D. Morgan, Governor of New York; Charles S. Olden, Governor of New Jersey; A[ndrew]. G. Curtin, Governor of Pennsylvania; A[ugustus]. W. Bradford, Governor of Maryland; F[rancis] H. Peirpont [Pierpont], Governor of Virginia; Austin Blair, Governor of Michigan; J[ohn]. B. Temple, President Military Board of Kentucky; Andrew Johnson, Governor of Tennessee; H[amilton]. R. Gamble, Governor of Missouri; O[liver]. P. Morton, Governor of Indiana; David Tod, Governor of Ohio; Alexander Ramsey, Governor of Minnesota; Richard Yates, Governor of Illinois; Edward Salomon, Governor of Wisconsin, June 28, 1862. To the President. *Ibid.*, p. 180. Abraham Lincoln. Executive Mansion Washington, July 1, 1862. To the Governors of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Michigan, Tennessee, Missouri, Indiana, Ohio, Minnesota, Illinois, and Wisconsin, and the President of the Military Board of Kentucky:

Frederick Phisterer, *Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1883), p. 62.

11. Thirty-seventh Congress. Session III. (Statute III.) Chap. LXXV, Approved, March 3, 1863. 12 *Statutes at Large* 731-37; *Cong. Globe*, XXXIII, pt. 2, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, February 12, 1863 to March 3, 1863; *Special Session*, March 4-14, 1863, Appendix, 209-11. On the Enrollment Act and its application, see Eugene C. Murdock, *One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971), especially on the act itself pp. 6-7; also Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization*, pp. 104-106, 111-12. See also Thirty-eighth Congress, Session I. (Statute I.) Chap. XII. — An Act to amend an Act entitled "An Act for enrolling and calling out the National Forces, and for other purposes," approved March third, eighteen hundred and sixty-three. Approved, February 24, 1864. 13 *Statutes at Large* (December 1863, to December 1864) (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1866), 6-11; *Cong. Globe*, XXXIV, pt. 4, 38th Congress, 1st Session, June 14, 1864 to July 4, 1864, Appendix, 140-42, particularly Sec. 17 on conscientious objectors, 13 *Statutes at Large* 9, *Cong. Globe*, p. 141; and Sec. 24, extending the draft to African Americans, 13 *Statutes at Large* 11, *Cong. Globe*, p. 142.

12. Article I. Section. VIII., paragraph 12, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 103-6 (serial 14152). *The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation: Annotations of Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of the United States to June 29, 1992*. Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Johnny H. Killian, George A. Costello, co-editors (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 8.

13. [Opinion on the Draft, September 14?] 1863, Autograph Draft, The Robert Todd Lincoln Collection, Library of Congress, Basler, ed., *Works of Lincoln*, VI, 444-49, quotation from 446.

14. Phillip G. Auchampaugh, "A Great Justice on State and Federal Power. Being the Thoughts of Chief Justice Taney on the Federal Conscription Act," *Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, 18:2 (October 1936), 72-87; Carl Brent Swisher, *Roger B. Taney* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935), pp. 570-71.

15. Selective Draft Law Cases, Argued December 13, 14, 1917. — Decided January 7, 1918. U.S. Supreme Court, *United States Reports Volume 245, Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court at October Term, 1917 from October 1, 1917 to March 4, 1918*, Ernest Knabel, Reporter (New York: The Banks Law Publishing Co., 1918), 366-90, Opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr. Chief Justice [William A.] White, 375-84.

16. 12 *Statutes at Large* 731-37, particularly Secs. 1-3, 731-32; *Cong. Globe*, XXXIII, pt. 2, Appendix, 209-11, Secs. 1-3, 209-10. See also Murdock, *One Million Men*, pp. 6-9; Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization*, pp. 104-106, 111-12.

17. Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization*, p. 106 for 35,883 statistic, citing "Final Report Made to the Secretary of War by the Provost Marshal General of the Operations of the Bureau of the Provost Marshal General of the United States from the Commencement of the Business of the Bureau, March 17, 1863 to March 17, 1866; the Bureau terminating by Law August 28, 1866," III, pt. 1, in U.S. War Department, *Messages and Documents, War Department, 1865-1866* (3 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1866), 175; Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization*, p. 107 for commutation fees.

18. Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization*, p. 108, citing for latter three figures "PMG Report," p. 95.

19. Thomas L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America* (Second Edition, Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1901; reprint, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1986), p. 102 for Union, 103 for Confederate.

20. "Seddon, James Alexander," in Mark Mayo Boatner III, *The Civil War Diction-*

ary (Revised Edition, New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 1991), p. 730.

21. Edwin B. Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 9, citing Charles Marshall, *An Aide-de-Camp of Lee, Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall, Sometime Aide-de-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee*, Sir Frederick Maurice, ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1927), p. 186. Coddington's is a model campaign history, and the present account of the campaign and battle of Gettysburg is deeply indebted to it. For Lee's conferences and planning, see I, "Lee Prepares for a Summer Campaign," pp. 3-25. See also Douglas Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography* (4 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Charles Scribner's Sons, Ltd., 1934-1935), III (1934), 18-20 for the initial planning and 20-161 for the campaign and battle. The present account of the Gettysburg campaign also makes much use of Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command* (3 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942-1944), III, *Gettysburg to Appomattox* (1944), xi-xiii, 2-205; Kenneth P. Williams, *Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War* (5 vols., New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950-1959), II (1950), Chapters XIX, "Good Marching and Quarrelsome Notes," 606-42, 835-40, XX, "A Courier from Washington at Three A.M.," 643-71, 840-43, XXI, "The First Two Days of Gettysburg," 672-707, 843-47, XXII, "The Battle Ends, the Arguments Begin," 708-29, 847-50, XXIII, "A Feeble Effort at Pursuit," 730-59, 850-56. For a vivid account of the invasion of Pennsylvania by a civilian eyewitness, see Jacob Hoke, *The Great Invasion of 1863; or, General Lee in Pennsylvania. Embracing an Account of The Strength and Organization of the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia; Their Daily Marches with the Routes of Travel, and General Orders Issued; The Three Days of Battle; The Retreat of the Confederates and Pursuit by the Federals; Analytical Index, Maps, Portraits, and a large number of Illustrations of the Battle-field. With an Appendix Containing an Account of the Burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, A Statement of the General Sickles Controversy, and other Valuable Historic Papers* (Dayton, O.: W. J. Shuey, 1887; reprint, New York, London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959). For a modern account of the preliminaries to the battle, see Wilbur Sturtevant Nye, *Here Come the Rebels!* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965). Kent Gramm, *Gettysburg: A Meditation on War and Values* (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994) is an eloquent fulfillment of its subtitle. Gabor S. Borritt, ed., *The Gettysburg Nobody Knows* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) presents stimulating essays toward new insights into the battle and campaign.

22. For Ewell's position and command, "Ewell, Richard Stoddert," Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, pp. 268-69, particularly 269; "II Corps (Jackson's, Ewell's, Early's)," *ibid.*, pp. 179-81, particularly 180. See also Chapter II, "The Reorganization That Explains Gettysburg," Freeman, *Lee*, III, 8-17, particularly 12, 13-14.

23. For Brandy Station, see Fairfax Downey, *Clash of Cavalry: The Battle of Brandy Station, June 9, 1863* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1959); Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, III, "Brandy Station: A Double Surprise," pp. 47-72, 613-20; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, III, 5-19; Emory M. Thomas, *Bold Dragoon: The Life of J. E. B. Stuart* (New York, Cambridge, Philadelphia, San Francisco, London, Mexico City, São Paulo, Singapore, Sydney: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986), pp. 220-30; Mark Nesbitt, *Saber and Scapegoat: J. E. B. Stuart and the Gettysburg Controversy* (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1994), pp. 38-40; Edward G. Longacre, *The Cavalry at Gettysburg: A Tactical Study of Mounted Operations during the Civil War's Pivotal Campaign 9 June-14 July 1863* (Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1986), pp. 39-86; Edward G. Longacre, *General John Buford* (Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Combined Books, 1995), pp. 159-68.

24. A. Lincoln, Washington, D.C., June 5, 1863. to Major General Hooker, Autograph Letter Signed, Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, Illinois, Basler, ed., *Works of Lincoln*, VI, 249; O.R., XXVII, pt. 1 (serial 43, 1889), 31.

25. For Hill's promotion and command, "Hill, Ambrose Powell," Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, p. 400; "III Corps (A. P. Hill's)," *ibid.*, p. 181. See also Freeman, *Lee*, III, 11, 12, 14, and the authoritative biography, James I. Robertson, Jr., *General A. P. Hill: The Story of a Confederate Warrior* (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 193-204, particularly 193 for Hill's corps command.

26. A. G. Curtin. By the Governor: [seal] Eli Slifer, Secretary of the Commonwealth. Pennsylvania, ss: In the name and by the authority of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Andrew G. Curtin, Governor of the said Commonwealth. A Proclamation. [June 12, 1863.] O.R., XXVII, pt. 3 (serial 45, 1889), 80-81. On the militia, see Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, Chapter VI, "Pennsylvania Prepares for Invasion," pp. 134-52, 636-43, which appeared essentially, under the same title, in *Pennsylvania History: Quarterly Journal of the Pennsylvania Historical Association*, 31:2 (April 1964), 157-75; also Nye, *Here Come the Rebels!* Chapter 12, "The Minutemen Spring to Arms," pp. 212-21, 380.

27. Abraham Lincoln, By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State, June 15, 1863, By the President of the United States of America. A Proclamation. Document Signed, National Archives, Record Group 11, Proclamations, Basler, ed., *Works of Lincoln*, VI, 277-78; O.R., XXVII, pt. 3 (serial 45), 136.

28. A. G. Curtin. By the Governor: [seal] Eli Slifer, Secretary of the Commonwealth. Pennsylvania, ss: In the name and by the authority of the Commonwealth. A Proclamation. [June 26, 1863.] O.R., XXVII, pt. 3 (serial 45), 347-48.

29. Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, pp. 144-45.

30. Chas. W. Sandford, Major-General. Hdqrs 1st Div., New York State National Guards, New York, December 20, 1863. To Brig. Gen. John T. Sprague, Adjutant-General, State of New York. O.R., XXVII, pt. 2 (serial 44, 1889), 227-29, statistic from 227.

31. George W. Fahnestock Diary (7 vols., Jan. 1, 1863-Dec. 31, 1867, Jan. 1, 1869-Dec. 31, 1873), The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, June 27, 1863.

32. *Ibid.*, June 25, 1863.

33. Quoted in Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, p. 166, citing Early to J. Fraise Richard, May 7, 1866, Jubal A. Early Correspondence, Library of Congress. See in general Coddington's Chapter VII, "The Confederates Plunder Pennsylvania," pp. 153-79, 643-51, which essentially appeared also as "Prelude to Gettysburg: The Confederates Plunder Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania History*, 30:2 (April 1963), 123-57, quotation from 139.

34. Harrison was not fully identified until the appearance of James O. Hall's article "The Spy Harrison: A Modern Hunt for a Fabled Agent," *Civil War Times Illustrated*, 24:10 (February 1986), 18-25. Harrison reported to Lee through Longstreet; for his information on June 28, see Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, p. 181; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, III, 48-49. Nesbit, *Saber and Scapegoat* argues with considerable persuasiveness that Stuart is not to be blamed in a major way for the Confederates' cavalry reconnaissance woes, but that the cavalry commander adhered substantially to Lee's (characteristically ambiguous) orders to him. While it is also true that in taking with him the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and William Henry Fitzhugh Lee (the latter commanded by Colonel John R. Chambliss, Jr., 5th Virginia Cavalry), Stuart left Lee with the cavalry brigades of Brigadier-Generals Beverly H. Robertson, Alfred G. Jenkins, and William E. Jones (along with the independent brigade of Brigadier-General John D. Imboden), and that it is difficult to imagine that the opening of the battle of Gettysburg could have been much different if Stuart had been in contact with Lee, it remains true that Stuart's absence adversely affected Lee's confidence and perhaps his

judgment, and when Stuart rejoined late on July 2 he brought a badly fatigued command unable to contribute all that it might have to the battle of July 3. For Stuart's raid, see also Thomas, *Bold Dragoon*, pp. 239-46; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, III, 54-72; Longacre, *Cavalry at Gettysburg*, 8, "Stuart's Expedition — Salem to Hanover," pp. 148-60, 295-97, and 11, "Stuart's Expedition — Hanover to Gettysburg," pp. 193-202, 303-304. An especially judicious appraisal is Emory M. Thomas, 5, "Eggs, Aldie, Shepherdstown, and J. E. B. Stuart," in Borrit, ed., *The Gettysburg Nobody Knows*, pp. 101-21, 235-37.

35. The first day at Gettysburg is examined in overwhelming detail in David G. Martin, *Gettysburg July 1* (Completely Revised Edition, Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Combined Books, 1996). Careful but less minutely detailed coverage appears in Warren W. Hassler, Jr., *Crisis at the Crossroads: The First Day at Gettysburg* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1970). The day's principal controversies, especially of leadership, are analyzed in Gary W. Gallagher, ed., *The First Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership* (Kent, Ohio and London, England: Kent State University Press, 1992). The standard Union and Confederate accounts of the war in the East are again worth consulting: Freeman, *Lee*, III, 65-85; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, III, 77-109; Williams, *Lincoln Finds a General*, II, 682-91. Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, remains unexcelled; see pp. 263-322, 683-713 for the first day's battle. On Buford's opening of the battle, see Longacre, *Buford*, pp. 180-96, 202-203, and the same author's *Cavalry at Gettysburg*, pp. 180-90.

36. Harry W. Pfanz presents a magisterial assessment of the vexed question whether the Confederates could have taken Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill on July 1, and whether Ewell is blameworthy for their not doing so, in his *Gettysburg — Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill* (Gary W. Gallagher, ed., *Civil War America*, Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), pp. 64-152; 416-33. Pfanz gives a briefer appraisal in 3, "'Old Jack' Is Not Here," Borrit, ed., *The Gettysburg Nobody Knows*, pp. 56-74, 232-35. Other acute appraisals are by Alan T. Nolan, "R. E. Lee and July 1 at Gettysburg," in Gallagher, ed., *The First Day at Gettysburg*, pp. 1-29, 144-46, particularly 24-28, and Gary W. Gallagher, "Confederate Corps Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg: A. P. Hill and Richard S. Ewell in a Difficult Debut," *ibid.*, pp. 30-56, 146-50, particularly 36-40, 47-56. See Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, pp. 301-22; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 70-80, 148-49; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, III, Chapter VI, significantly and dubiously entitled "Ewell Cannot Reach a Decision," 90-105, and 171-73; Williams, *Lincoln Finds a General*, II, 686-91; Martin, *Gettysburg July 1*, pp. 481-539, 550-67; Hassler, *Crisis at the Crossroads*, pp. 130-38.

37. For more critical views of Lee's decision to fight at Gettysburg, see Alan T. Nolan, *Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History* (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), Chapter Four, "General Lee," pp. 59-107, 194-202, particularly 90-101 questioning the whole Gettysburg campaign and 95-96 on staying at Gettysburg after July 1; reprinted in Gary W. Gallagher, ed., *Lee the Soldier* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 225-74, particularly 250-60, 255-56. A review of the controversy is Gary W. Gallagher, "'If the Enemy Is There, We Must Attack Him': R. E. Lee and the Second Day at Gettysburg," in Gary W. Gallagher, ed., *The Second Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership* (Kent, Ohio and London, England: Kent State University Press, 1993), pp. 1-32, 173-78. See also Freeman, *Lee*, III, 81-85; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, III, 106-12; Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, pp. 360-68.

The following account of the second day's battle at Gettysburg draws largely on the meticulously detailed work of Harry W. Pfanz, *Gettysburg: The Second Day* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), and for the Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill phases, the same author's *Gettysburg — Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill*, pp. 166-283, 434-55; Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, pp. 363-454, 729-74; Gal-

lagher, ed., *Second Day at Gettysburg*; Glenn Tucker, *High Tide at Gettysburg: The Campaign in Pennsylvania* (Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. Publishers, 1958), pp. 197–306; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 86–105; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, III, 109–40; Williams, *Lincoln Finds a General*, II, 693–706.

For an admirably objective discussion of the reasons for the lateness of Longstreet's attack on July 2, see Chapter 6, "Confederate Preparations, 2 July," in Pfanz, *Gettysburg: The Second Day*, pp. 104–23, 487–91. This analysis, though not uncritical of Longstreet, offsets the excessively harsh treatment of him by Freeman in *Lee*, III, 82–99, 149–50 and, to a lesser extent, in *Lee's Lieutenants*, III, 110–20, 173–76; although Freeman himself concluded that the Federal left was held strongly enough early enough that no Confederate assault upon it on July 2 was likely to succeed, *ibid.*, Appendix II, "Organization of the Federal Left at Gettysburg, July 1–2, 1863," 757–60. Tucker, *High Tide at Gettysburg*, pp. 231–36, 245–48, is sympathetic to Longstreet, as is William Garrett Piston, *Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History* (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1987), pp. 50–58; the latter book is primarily a study of how Longstreet's willingness to criticize Lee and his postwar Republicanism became the foundations for making him a scapegoat for Confederate defeat. The standard modern biography is remarkably objective and is indeed more critical of Longstreet on July 2 than the present writer is inclined to be: Jeffry D. Wert, *General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier—A Biography* (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Simon & Schuster, 1993), pp. 257–79.

For Sickles's advance to the Peach Orchard salient, see Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, pp. 343–57, 385–86; Pfanz, *Gettysburg: The Second Day*, pp. 93–103, and Chapter 7, "Sickles Takes Up the Forward Line," pp. 124–48, 491–96; and William Glenn Robertson, "The Peach Orchard Revisited: Daniel E. Sickles and the Third Corps on July 2, 1863," Gallagher, ed., *Second Day at Gettysburg*, pp. 33–56, 178–82. Kent Gramm, 4, "The Chances of War: Lee, Longstreet, Sickles, and the First Minnesota Volunteers," Boritt, ed., *The Gettysburg Nobody Knows*, pp. 75–100, 234–35 ponders the effects of contingency upon the events of the battle on the Union left on July 2.

Glenn LaFantasie, 2, "Joshua Chamberlain and the American Dream," *ibid.*, pp. 31–55, 254–56, discusses the recent rise of Chamberlain to the most prominent role in histories of the defense of Little Round Top. Oliver Willcox Norton, a participant, presents much evidence regarding conflicting claims to prominence in that defense in *The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top, Gettysburg, July 2, 1863* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1913; reprint, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: Stan Clark Military Books, 1992). On the battle for Little Round Top, see also Pfanz, *Gettysburg: The Second Day*, Chapter 10, "Little Round Top," pp. 201–40, 505–13; Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, pp. 388–96, 739–45.

The numbers—13,000 Confederates in the battle on the Union left below the Round Tops, 10,000 Federals, 15,000 in the Sixth Corps—are based, respectively, on calculations from Coddington's estimates of the total size of the Army of Northern Virginia, *Gettysburg Campaign*, pp. 248–49; the estimates of those present from the Union Third Corps in Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, Appendix II, 759; and Coddington's estimate that the Sixth Corps "represented about a fifth of his [Meade's] infantry strength balanced against his estimate of the size of Meade's army," pp. 356, 249–50.

38. For the climactic Confederate attack on July 3 known as Pickett's Charge, and for the historical controversies surrounding it, see Carol Reardon, *Pickett's Charge in History and Memory*, Gary W. Gallagher, ed., *Civil War America* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). See also George R. Stewart, *Pickett's Charge: A Microhistory of the Final Attack at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959). Salient points are made by Carol Reardon also in 6, "I Think the Union Army Had Something to Do with It: The Pickett's Charge Nobody Knows,"

Boritt, ed., *The Gettysburg Nobody Knows*, pp. 122-43, 237-42, and in Carol Reardon, "Pickett's Charge: The Convergence of History and Myth in the Southern Past," Gary W. Gallagher, ed., *The Third Day at Gettysburg & Beyond* (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 56-92. In the latter book, see also William Garrett Piston, "Cross Purposes: Longstreet, Lee, and Confederate Attack Plans for July 3 at Gettysburg," pp. 31-55. See also Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, pp. 454-64, 483-520, 526-34; Freeman, *Lee*, III, 103-35; Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, III, 144-64; Tucker, *High Tide at Gettysburg*, pp. 331-79; Williams, *Lincoln Finds a General*, II, 709-19, 722-24.

For the morning action on Culp's Hill, see especially Pfanz, *Gettysburg—Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill*, pp. 284-335, 435-59; Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, pp. 468-76, 778-82.

Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, p. 777 n114 estimates Pickett's Division at 5,000 men, and p. 462 offers the estimate of 13,500 as the total strength of the assault. *Ibid.*, p. 462 gives the strength of the supporting artillery as 159 guns, p. 477 the number of Union guns from Ziegler's Grove just west of Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top as seventy-seven.

39. For the cavalry battle, see Longacre, *Cavalry at Gettysburg*, pp. 220-25, 226-31, 237-39, 244; Thomas, *Bold Dragoon*, pp. 247-49; Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, pp. 520-21. For Gregg's statement that Confederate sources said Stuart had from 6,000 to 7,000 men, *ibid.*, p. 801 n153, citing Gregg to J. E. Carpenter, Dec. 27, 1877, Copy, William Brooke Rawle Papers, The Historical Society of Pennsylvania. The present estimates of strength are based on units engaged and Coddington's figures *ibid.*, pp. 801-802 n153. Longacre, *Cavalry at Gettysburg*, p. 220 estimates Stuart's total force at 6,000. Losses were relatively small; Longacre, *ibid.*, p. 244, accepts the figures of 254 total Federal casualties and almost 200 Confederate. For Custer's promotion, "Custer, George Armstrong," in Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, From Its Organization, September 29, 1789, to March 2, 1903*. Published under act of Congress approved March 2, 1903. 57th Congress, Second Session, House Document 446 (serial 4536). (2 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), I, 348.

40. For Confederate losses, Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, p. 103; for Union, *ibid.*, p. 102. For Lincoln's displeasure with Meade, see particularly his unsent letter of rebuke, Executive Mansion, Washington, July 14, 1863. Major General Meade, Autograph Letter, Robert Todd Lincoln Collection, Library of Congress, Basler, ed., *Works of Lincoln*, VI, 327-28; also A. Lincoln, Soldiers' Home, [Washington,] July 6, 1863—7 p.m. Major-General Halleck, *ibid.*, 318, from O.R. XXVII, pt. 3 (serial 45), 567. For a highly critical account of Meade's conduct of the pursuit, see Williams, *Lincoln Finds a General*, II, 730-56; for a judicious and more sympathetic view, Coddington, *Gettysburg Campaign*, pp. 536-73, 807-20. Also supportive of Meade is A. Wilson Greene, "From Gettysburg to Falling Waters: Meade's Pursuit of Lee," Gallagher, ed., *Third Day at Gettysburg & Beyond*, pp. 161-201. The standard biography of Meade remains Freeman Cleaves, *Meade of Gettysburg* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960); for the Gettysburg campaign, see pp. 120-88, particularly pp. 172-88 for the pursuit.

41. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, pp. 86 for Seven Days casualties, 89 for Second Manassas and Chantilly casualties and strength, 92 for Antietam casualties and strength, 99 for Chancellorsville casualties and strength. The figure of 85,500 at the Seven Days is Freeman's, *Lee*, II, 230; it seems more likely than the 95,481 accepted by Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, p. 86.

42. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, I, *Manassas to Malvern Hill* (1942), xviii.

43. Craig L. Symonds, *Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography* (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), p. 183, for Davis, Holmes, and Randolph; "Ran-